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LEWIS V. HUMBOLDT ACQUISITION CORP.: INCONSISTENT
WITH PRECEDENT, INCONSISTENT WITH ITSELF,
INCONSISTENT WITH THE SUPREME COURT
Evan Toebbe∗

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, as a response to what it perceived as prejudicial and
antiquated attitudes regarding disabled Americans, Congress passed the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1 The ADA was intended to
remove the societal and institutional barriers which obstructed
physically and mentally disabled people from fully participating in
society.2 Unfortunately, current judicial interpretation of the ADA may
be hampering the efforts by Congress to eradicate disability-based
discrimination.
In 2006, Humboldt Acquisition Group dismissed Susan Lewis from
her position as a registered nurse.3 Lewis claimed that she was
discharged, in violation of the ADA, as a result of a medical condition.4
Humboldt, however, responded that it discharged Lewis because of an
outburst in which she yelled, used profanity, and criticized supervisors.5
When the case subsequently went to trial on Lewis’s ADA claims, the
court refused to instruct the jury, as Lewis requested, that an ADA
violation could be established if the employee’s disability was a
motivating factor in the employment decision.6 Rather, the court
accepted Humboldt’s version of liability in which an ADA claimant had
to prove that the employee’s disability was the sole cause of the adverse
employment decision.7 After the jury subsequently found in favor of
Humboldt,8 Lewis appealed. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, agreed to hear the case.9 The en banc panel did, in fact, depart
∗ Associate Member, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553.
(2008).
2. Id.
3. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
4. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 634 F.3d 879, 880 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that Lewis
suffered from an unspecified medical condition that, among other things, affected her lower extremities.
She alleged that the condition made it difficult for her to walk and prevented her from working for one
month. When she did return to work, she sometimes needed a wheelchair).
5. Id.
6. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 314.
7. Id.
8. Judgement, Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2009) (No. 071054-JDB).
9. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., No. 09-6381, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11941, at *1
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from the “sole-cause” standard but ultimately held that a but-for test, not
a motivating factor test, was the appropriate standard.
Relying on prior precedent, statutory interpretation, legislative
history, and policy considerations, this Casenote will analyze the Sixth
Circuit’s treatment of the ADA’s causation standard, focusing heavily
on the propriety of the Lewis decision. This Casenote ultimately
suggests that the Sixth Circuit failed to properly interpret the ADA and
simply substituted one incorrect interpretation of the ADA for another
when it adopted the “but for” test. Part II of the Casenote will lay out
the framework for the development of the ADA’s causation standard.
This will involve a progression through the web of the relevant cases
and statutes and their corresponding impact on the understanding of the
ADA’s causation standard. Part III will provide a more detailed
explanation of Lewis. Part IV will begin by briefly reiterating the
differences between the various causation standards that may be applied
and will lay out the current trend in ADA cases. Part IV will then
discuss the impropriety of the Lewis decision and argue that the decision
conflicts with recent Sixth Circuit precedent, is internally inconsistent,
and is not mandated by the Supreme Court. This Part will also detail
Lewis’s departure from congressional intent and the decision’s policy
implications. Part V will conclude by summarizing the arguments
presented and discussing possible avenues for change.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADA
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act and with it, Title VII.10
This landmark legislation promotes equal employment opportunities and
prevents discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups.11
Specifically, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee “because of” the employee’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.12 Early on, the Supreme Court established a
burden shifting framework in which the employee was first required to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.13 If this requirement was
satisfied, the burden then shifted to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision; and
(6th Cir. June 2, 2011) (order granting rehearing en banc).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
11. Mark R. Bandsuch, Ten Troubles with Title VII and Trait Discrimination Plus One Simple
Solutions (A Totality of the Circumstances Framework), 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 965, 965 (2009).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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if the employer was successful, the burden shifted back to the employee
to show that the proffered reason was simply a pretext.14 These early
cases assumed that the adverse decision was either “because of” a
legitimate reason or “because of” an illegitimate reason.15 This
framework, however, was soon found be to ill-suited for employment
decisions that were influenced by both legitimate and illegitimate factors
because it allowed employers to escape liability by advancing a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that, while not pretextual, was not
actually the primary justification.16 Thus, the Supreme Court was left to
determine how cases in which the motivations were mixed would be
handled.17 The Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins helped
to somewhat answer this question.
B. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Anna Hopkins was a senior manager in a Price Waterhouse office.18
In 1982, Hopkins was considered for partnership. Hopkins possessed
both attractive and unattractive qualities.19 While she was viewed as a
highly competent project leader who worked long hours and pushed
vigorously to meet deadlines, she could also be abrasive, unduly harsh,
and impatient with the staff.20 Instead of granting or denying the
partnership, Hopkin’s candidacy was held for reconsideration until the
following year.21 However, when the time came, the partners refused to
reconsider her for partnership.22 Hopkins brought suit under Title VII,
claiming that the firm had discriminated against her based on sex.23
While Price Waterhouse did have legitimate reasons for denying
Hopkins partnership (i.e. her poor interpersonal skills), it was also clear
that Hopkins received poor reviews based on gender stereotypes.24 The
partner reviews included comments such as, “She overcompensates for
being a woman;” she should take a “course in charm school;” and she
should walk, talk, and dress more femininely.25
14. Id. at 802–04.
15. Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides, The Hydra Problem in Statutory
Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 881 (2012).
16. Id. at 882.
17. Id.
18. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989).
19. Id. at 234 (detailing both the attractive and unattractive qualities of Ms. Hopkins).
20. Id. at 234–35.
21. Id. at 231.
22. Id. at 231–32.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 235.
25. Id.
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Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality,26 held that gender should be
irrelevant to employment decisions and that to construe the words
“because of” to mean “but for” was to misunderstand them.27 Justice
Brennan found that a plaintiff in a Title VII case need only to show that
gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision.28 However,
in an attempt to harmonize this with the employer’s need for freedom of
choice, the plurality found that the employer had an affirmative defense
allowing the employer to avoid liability if it could show that the same
decision would have been made even if gender had played no role in the
decision.29 As this was a plurality opinion, there is a question of what
opinion controls. Most courts have found that Justice O’Connor
concurred on the narrowest grounds and thus her opinion is
controlling.30 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence echoes the burden
shifting test set out by the plurality, differing mainly in relation to an
evidentiary standard that is not applicable to this Casenote.31
C. Passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
In 1990, with this background in place, Congress passed the
The ADA prohibits
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).32
discrimination against disabled persons in a variety of areas.33 Title I,
dealing with employment discrimination, mandates that “no covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
‘because of’ the disability of such individual.”34 The ADA did not
include its own enforcement provisions; rather, Congress crossreferenced the ADA with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.35 This crossreference established that the powers, remedies, and procedures under
26. Id. at 231 (Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
27. Id. at 240.
28. Id. at 244.
29. Id. at 244–45.
30. While Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is typically thought to be controlling, it is essentially
a restatement of Justice Brennan’s opinion with a different evidentiary standard; a distinction that is not
relevant for the purposes of this Casenote. See Widiss, supra note 15, at 884; see also Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when no rationale has the assent of five justices, the
court is viewed to have taken the position of the narrowest concurrence).
31. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
32. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
33. Id. (prohibiting discrimination in employment, public services, public accommodations and
services operated by private entities, and telecommunications).
34. Id. § 102(a). The ADA was amended in 2008 to replace “because of” with “on the basis of.”
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2008). This amendment is discussed briefly in section D(4) of this Casenote.
However, most courts and scholars do not believe this amendment changes the analysis of the ADA’s
causation standard, and, therefore, this Casenote focuses on the “because of” language. See Widiss,
supra note 15, at 913.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1990).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/8

4

Toebbe: Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp.: Inconsistent with Precedent,

2013]

CASENOTE—LEWIS V. HUMBOLDT ACQUISITION CORP.

1567

the ADA would be identical to those set forth in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4,
20000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9.36
D. The 1991 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act
The next major development in discrimination jurisprudence came
just a year later with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA
of 1991).37 Congress stated that the purpose of the act was to respond to
recent Supreme Court decisions by amending, and expanding the scope
of, relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection
to victims of discrimination.38 This goal was accomplished by making it
clear that Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of”
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was satisfied when one of
these impermissible considerations was a “motivating factor” in an
adverse employment decision.39 The relevant language stated:
[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
40
also motivated the practice.

This language, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), represents a partial
codification of the Price Waterhouse holding by allowing a plaintiff to
satisfy its burden simply by showing that a discriminatory consideration
played a role in the adverse employment decision.41
The CRA of 1991 also amended Price Waterhouse’s holding that an
employer had an affirmative defense completely barring liability if it
could show that the same action would have been taken without the
impermissible consideration.42 After the CRA of 1991, if an employee
establishes that an impermissible consideration was a motivating factor
in the employer’s decision, then the court can grant declatory relief,
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees even if the employer can show that
the same decision would have been made without the impermissible
consideration.43 Ultimately, while the amendment does away with the
complete affirmative defense from Price Waterhouse, the employer still

36. Id.
37. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
38. Id. § 3 (Purposes).
39. Id. § 107(a) (Clarifying Prohibition Against Impermissible Consideration of Race, Color,
Religion, Sex or National Origin in Employment Pracitces).
40. Id.
41. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); see also id. at 261 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
42. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(b).
43. Id.
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has a partial defense if it can show that the same decision would have
been made regardless of the impermissible consideration (the samedecision test).44 In that case, the court is limited to the remedies above
(declatory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees) and cannot award
damages or require admission, reinstatement, hiring, or promotion.45
This amendment was codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, a section crossreferenced by the ADA.46
E. Supreme Court Decides Gross v. FBL Financial Services
After the CRA of 1991, courts generally interpreted the term “because
of” in anti-discrimination statutes to be consistent with the “motivating
factor” test laid out in Price Waterhouse and codified as amended in
Title VII.47 However, in 2009, the Supreme Court entered the picture
again in Gross v. FBL Financial Services and introduced doubt into this
area of the law.48
In this case, Jack Gross was an employee of FBL Financial Group,
Inc. (FBL) for more than thirty years and had risen to the position of
claims administration director.49 In 2003, however, when Gross was 54
years old, he was demoted and his old position was given to a younger
co-worker whom Gross had previously supervised.50
Gross
subsequently brought suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA), which makes it unlawful to take adverse action
against an employee “because of” the employee’s age.51
The district court instructed the jury that it was required to return a
verdict for Gross if he proved that his age was a “motivating factor” in
FBL’s decision to demote him.52 The district court also instructed the
jury that it must find for FBL if FBL proved that it would have chosen
to demote Gross regardless of his age.53 The jury returned a verdict for
Gross.54 Subsequently, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court due to a perceived error regarding the appropriate

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1990).
47. See, e.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336–37 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing to
and agreeing with several other circuits’ adoption of mixed-motive analysis in ADA cases).
48. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
49. Id. at 170.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 170–71.
53. Id. at 171.
54. Id.
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evidentiary standard.55
Thus, on appeal of the Eight Circuit’s decision, the question actually
presented to the Supreme Court was whether or not an employee had to
present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a motivatingfactor, burden shifting instruction under a non-Title VII discrimination
case.56 The Supreme Court, however, did not answer this question and
instead held that the burden never shifts to the employer defending a
mixed-motive discrimination claim under the ADEA.57 Writing for the
Court, Justice Thomas reasoned that Title VII and the ADEA were
materially different with respect to the burden of persuasion and thus
ADEA claims are not controlled by Title VII jurisprudence.58 The Court
stated that it should be careful not to apply the rules of “one statute to a
different statute without careful and critical examination.”59
Title VII, the Court said, had been explicitly amended to authorize
discrimination claims in which an improper consideration was a
“motivating factor” in the adverse employment decision.60 The text of
the ADEA, however, does not state that the plaintiff can establish a
claim by simply showing that age was a motivating factor.61 The Court
was influenced by the fact that Congress explicitly amended Title VII to
allow for the “motivating factor” test but did not, at the same time,
amend the ADEA to include the motivating factor language even though
Congress simultaneously amended other parts of the ADEA.62 The
Court also looked to the dictionary definition of “because of” and found
that its ordinary meaning meant that Gross had to establish that his age
was the reason that the employer decided to act or, put another way, that
his age was the but-for cause of the adverse decision.63 Therefore, to be
successful under the ADEA, Gross held that a plaintiff must show that
age was the but-for cause of the challenged employment decision, and
even if the employee shows that age was a motivating factor in the
decision, the burden does not shift to the employer to show that it would

55. Id. at 172 (finding that the jury instructions were flawed because they allowed Gross to shift
the burden to FBL upon presentation of a preponderance of any category of evidence showing that age
was a motivating factor, rather than direct evidence. The Eight Circuit reasoned that Justice O’Connor’s
controlling concurrence in Price Waterhouse required the plaintiff to present direct evidence that the
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the employment decision before the burden could be
shifted to the employer and before a mixed motive instruction could be obtained).
56. Id. at 173.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 174.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 176.
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have made the same decision regardless of age.64
III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN LEWIS V. HUMBOLDT
The major question stemming from Gross was how this decision
would impact the causation standard of other anti-discrimination
statutes. An area that seemed particularly uncertain after Gross was the
ADA. Lewis solved the dilemma on how the Sixth Circuit would
interpret the ADA’s causation standard post-Gross. This Part first
discusses the facts and background of the Lewis decision and then
describes the majority and dissenting opinions.
A. The Facts and Background
The facts presented to both the three-judge panel and the en banc
court were relatively sparse. Susan Lewis worked as a registered nurse
at a retirement home owned by Humboldt Acquisition Corp.65 In March
2006, Humboldt terminated Lewis’s employment. Lewis then sued
Humboldt under Title I of the ADA, claiming that she was fired because
of her medical condition that made it difficult for her to walk and
occasionally required her to use a wheelchair.66 Humboldt, however,
claimed that it fired Lewis based on an outburst at work in which she
supposedly yelled, used profanity, and criticized supervisors.67
At trial, Lewis asked the court to instruct jury that it must find in her
favor if it determined that her disability was a “motivating factor” in
Humboldt’s decision to terminate her.68 The district court, however,
consistent with circuit precedent, instructed the jury that Lewis could
recover only if her disability was the “sole” reason for the adverse
employment decision.69 Based on this instruction, the jury found for
Humboldt.70 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, a three judge panel upheld
the jury instruction.71 The court acknowledged that this standard was out
of step with other circuits but reasoned that, according to a well
established rule of the circuit, one three-judge panel could not overrule
another three-judge panel without an intervening inconsistent ruling

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 180.
Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 634 F.3d 879, 880 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881 (originally before Merritt, Clay, and Griffin, JJ).
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from the Supreme Court.72 Because contrary Supreme Court precedent
was nonexistent, the only avenue for change would be an overruling by
the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc.73 Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit did,
in fact, agree to hear the case en banc.74
B. The Majority Opinion
To begin, the en banc panel unanimously agreed that it should
overrule circuit precedent holding that an ADA claimant was required to
prove that his/her disability was the “sole” reason for the adverse
employment decision.75 This causation standard was established in the
mid-1990s when the Sixth Circuit transplanted this “sole” reason test
from the Rehabilitation Act to the ADA because the two acts had
parallel protections and goals.76 The court recognized that this
interpretation of the ADA’s causation standard was out of sync with the
other circuits and should be abolished.77 The panel was guided by the
rule from Gross that courts must refrain from “applying rules
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and
critical examination.”78 Ultimately, the court held that different words
usually convey different meanings and a law establishing liability
against employers who discriminate “because of” an employee’s
disability does not require the employee to show that an adverse
employment decision was made “solely” because of that disability
discrimination.79
While the “sole-cause” standard was unanimously abolished, the
court was sharply divided on what causation standard should take its
place.80 After doing away with the “sole-cause” standard, the majority
then also rejected applying the “motivating factor” standard. Instead, it

72. Id. at 879–81.
73. Id. at 881; see also Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996)
(prior circuit precedent establishing the “sole-cause” test).
74. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., No. 09-6381, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11941, at *1
(6th Cir. June 2, 2011) (order granting rehearing en banc).
75. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 322 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a unanimous Sixth Circuit agrees that the “solecause” standard is inappropriate for determining causation under the ADA).
76. Id. at 314. For early cases applying the “sole-cause” test to the ADA, see Maddox v. Univ. of
Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995) and Monette, 90 F.3d at 1178 (6th Cir. 1996).
77. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 315.
78. Id. at 316.
79. Id. at 315–16.
80. Judges Sutton, Batchelder, Boggs, Gibbons, Rogers, Cook, McKeague, Griffin, and
Kethledge agreed that a “but for” standard was appropriate. Judges Clay, Martin, Stranch, Moore, Cole,
White, and Donald believed that a “motivating factor” standard was appropriate.
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replaced the “sole-cause” standard with a “but for” test.81
As is typical of most courts that have analyzed this issue, the majority
briefly detailed the history of the ADA and other anti-discrimination
statutes.82 Specifically, the court noted that Congress passed Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make it unlawful to discriminate
against an individual because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.83 The court then stated that Price Waterhouse
created a burden shifting framework for Title VII claims in which an
employee who proved that discrimination was a motivating factor in the
employment decision was able to shift the burden to the employer who
was required to prove that the same decision would have been made
regardless of the impermissible discrimination.84 Then, two years after
the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress passed the CRA of 1991
codifying that an unlawful employment practice was established if race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in an
adverse employment decision and allowing limited remedies, consisting
of declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees, when the
employer can show that the same decision would have been made
regardless.85
The Lewis majority believed that they were only two ways to interpret
this history.86 The first possibility was that Price Waterhouse defined
the meaning of “because of” for Title VII and all similarly-worded antidiscrimination statutes as incorporating a “motivating factor” standard.87
The other option, the majority believed, was that by amending only Title
VII to allow recovery under a “motivating factor” standard, Congress
made this standard available to Title VII claimants but did not extend
this framework to other similar statutes.88
The majority then stated that the Gross Court adopted the second
option by deciding that the “motivating factor” standard did not apply to
the ADEA.89 The majority was persuaded by the Gross Court’s
reasoning that rules applicable to one standard should not be casually
applied to a different statute.90 The majority emphasized the Gross
Court’s concern that while Title VII was amended to include a

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Lewis, 681 F.3d at 321.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“motivating factor” standard, the ADEA was not similarly amended.91
Likewise, when Congress amended the ADA through the Civil Rights
Acts of 1991, it did not specifically provide for an ADA “motivating
factor” standard.92 This, the majority reasoned, must be presumed to be
an intentional omission.93
The majority also rejected the argument that the ADA’s crossreference of Title VII alleviates the concern about not specifically
incorporating the motivating factor language into the ADA.94 This
majority emphasized the fact that the ADA’s cross-reference to Title VII
does not include section 2000e-2 of Title VII, which actually
enumerates the “motivating factor” standard.95 The majority further
rejected the argument that this issue is cured by the fact that section
2000e-5, which is explicitly cross-referenced by the ADA, establishes a
set of limited remedies for claimants who demonstrate that
discrimination was a motivating factor in an adverse employment
decision.96 The majority reasoned that the language of section 2000e-5
allows limited remedies only if the claimant can prove that
discrimination was a motivating factor under section 2000e-2, which
ADA claimants cannot do as 2000e-2 refers to discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; not a disability.97
Finally, the majority was not persuaded by the legislative history
tending to show that Congress desired the ADA to be analyzed under a
“motivating factor” standard.98 The majority reasoned that the best
indicator of legislative intent is the meaning of the actual text enacted,
not legislative reports.99 Further, the Lewis majority said it would not be
persuaded by legislative history because the Gross Court was not
persuaded by similar legislative history regarding the ADEA.100
C. The Dissenting Opinions
In total, seven of the 16 judges, while agreeing with the majority’s
decision to discontinue the application of the “sole-cause” standard,
argued that the appropriate causation standard was a “motivating factor”

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 319.
Id.
Id. 319–20.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id. at 321.
Id.
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test.101
1. Judge Clay: Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Judge Clay, joined by Judge Martin, began his opinion by concurring
in the majority’s judgment that the “sole-cause” standard should no
longer be applied.102 This, however, is where the agreement ended.
Judge Clay argued that because the ADA, unlike the ADEA, is
explicitly tied to Title VII, the court’s decision in this case was not
controlled by the Gross decision; rather, careful examination of the
ADA makes clear that a claimant only needs to prove that
discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse decision.103 In
support, Judge Clay argued that because the ADA explicitly crossreferences the “powers, remedies, and procedures” of Title VII, the
remedies provided by Title VII, including any changing interpretations
or amendments thereto, apply with equal force to the ADA.104
Judge Clay also argued that a “but for” standard—requiring the
plaintiff to prove that the adverse decision would not have been made
absent any discrimination—barely lessens the burden imposed by the
“sole-cause” standard.105 He also expressed concern that it will be too
difficult for plaintiffs to identify the exact state of mind of the employer
and too easy for the employer to avoid liability by simply offering a
myriad of non-discriminatory reasons for the decision.106 According to
Judge Clay, this is not compatible with the goal of ameliorating
disability-based discrimination.107
2. Judge Stranch: Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Judge Stranch, joined by Judges Moore, Cole, and White, weighed in
next.108 Joining with her fellow justices, Judge Stranch concurred in the
majority’s opinion that the “sole-cause” standard should be
abandoned.109 The concurrence however ended there, and Judge
Stranch dissented from the majority’s view that a “but for” standard
101. Judge Sutton delivered the opinion of the court, in which Batchelder, C.J., Boggs, Gibbons,
Rogers, Cook, McKeague, Griffin, and Kethledge, JJ., joined. Clay, Martin, Stranch, More, Cole, White,
and Donald, JJ., concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 312.
102. Id. at 322 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 324.
104. Id. at 322.
105. Id. at 323.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 324.
108. Id. at 325 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id.
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should be applied to the ADA.110
Judge Stranch began by discussing the importance of the ADA’s
timing.111 At the time the ADA was enacted, Price Waterhouse had just
interpreted the phrase “because of” to include a “motivating factor”
standard.112 With this context, Congress assumed that “because of” in
the ADA would be understood consistent with its contemporary
meaning.113 Further, Judge Stranch argued that the cross-reference not
only determined the ADA’s causation standard at that time, but
permanently linked the two statutes and ensured they would evolve in
tandem.114
Judge Stranch then took issue with the majority’s use of Gross in
guiding its decision.115 With Gross itself teaching that statutory
interpretation should be an individualized inquiry, applying Gross—a
case analyzing the ADEA—to this ADA claim was improper.116 Judge
Stranch pointed out that the ADEA, while also prohibiting adverse
employment decisions “because of” discrimination, was adopted in
1967, well outside the context of Price Waterhouse’s interpretation that
“because of” includes a “motivating factor” standard.117 Further, the
ADEA never cross-referenced Title VII as the ADA does.118 According
to Judge Stranch, these differences make the Gross decision inapplicable
to an ADA case.119
Additionally, Judge Stranch took issue with the majority’s statement
that it would not be persuaded by legislative history because the Gross
Court was not persuaded by the legislative history.120 The history of the
ADEA, Judge Stranch argued, is not the history of the ADA.121 Judge
Stranch then cited a House Report for the ADA that explained “if the
powers, remedies and procedures changed in Title VII . . . , they will
change identically under the ADA for persons with disabilities.”122 The
same report stated that “the purpose of the ADA [is] to provide civil
rights protections for persons with disabilities that are parallel to those

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
471).

Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 326–27.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 331.
Id.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (III), at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
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available to minorities and women.”123 Accordingly, to be faithful to
the fundamental purpose of statutory construction, namely giving effect
to the original meaning of the words Congress chose, Judge Stranch
believed that the court was required to adopt a “motivating factor”
standard.124
3. Judge Donald: Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
The final opinion was Judge Donald’s partial concurrence and partial
dissent. Like her colleagues, Judge Donald welcomed the abandonment
of the “sole-cause” standard.125 Again, the dissent was based on an
inability to accept the majority’s definition of “because of.”126
Rather than simply stating her view alone, Judge Donald laid out four
possible views of the proper ADA causation standard, only two of which
are relevant for this Casenote.127 One of the views was the majority’s
position that “because of” means “but for.”128 Under this view, no
burden shifting is allowed and the burden is the plaintiff’s alone to show
that the adverse employment decision would not have been made absent
any discrimination.129 Judge Donald could not accept this view.130
The other relevant view discussed by Judge Donald, and the one she
ultimately agreed with, was that the express linkage between the ADA
and Title VII shows that a “motivating factor” standard is appropriate
for the ADA.131 Judge Donald rejected the argument that the
“motivating factor” standard is inapplicable to the ADA simply because
Title VII’s “motivating factor” test appears in section 2000e-2(m), a
section that is not cross-referenced in the ADA.132 Judge Donald
pointed out that section 2000e-2 is expressly referenced twice in section
2000e-5 of Title VII, a section that is explicitly referenced in the

123. Id. (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing H.R REP. NO. 101-485 (III),
at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 471).
124. Id. (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id. (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 332.
127. Id. at 335. The four views included: (1) Price Waterhouse burden shifting applies to the
ADA but was nullified as to Title VII by the CRA of 1991; (2) motivating factor is the causation
standard for the ADA, based solely on the plain meaning of “because of;” (3) neither Price Waterhouse
or Title VII apply to the ADA, and because the ADA lacks explicit mixed-motive language, “because
of” in the ADA, means but-for; and (4) motivating factor is the causation standard for the ADA due to
the ADA’s explicit link to Title VII. Id. Only views three and four are discussed in this footnote.
128. Id. at 338.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 339.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 340.
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ADA.133 Further, the ADA cross-references section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of
Title VII, which provides remedies for plaintiffs who can establish a
claim under 2000e-2(m), but limits those remedies if the employer is
able to show that the same decision would have been made regardless of
the discriminatory consideration.134 Judge Donald argued that by
explicitly linking section 2000e-5 of Title VII to the ADA, Congress
declared that ADA plaintiffs are entitled to all the remedies described
therein (i.e. liability under a “motivating factor” standard).135
IV. DISCUSSION
This discussion will analyze both the impact and correctness of the
Lewis decision, ultimately coming to the conclusion that the case was
wrongly decided. Part A will discuss the impact of the decision; Part B
will argue that the majority’s decision in Lewis was inconsistent with
circuit precedent; Part C details the internal inconsistencies in Lewis;
and, finally, Part D discusses while the Lewis majority’s decision was
not mandated by Supreme Court precedent.
A. What is at Stake
Before discussing the Lewis case in detail, it is useful to clearly define
each relevant causation standard and briefly lay out the current state of
the law.
1. The Causation Standards: What Do They Mean
At this point, three causation standards have been discussed: the
“sole-cause” test, the “but for” test, and the “motivating factor” test.
The “sole-cause” test imputes the lowest standard of care on employers
and requires the claimant to prove that the adverse employment decision
was made exclusively based on the impermissible consideration and for
no other reason. This test is no longer followed by any circuit.136 The
“but for” test, the test adopted by the Lewis majority, requires the
claimant to prove that the impermissible consideration was the
determinative factor in the adverse employment decision and, if other
legitimate reasons contributed to the decision, that the same decision
would not have been made absent the discriminatory consideration.137
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315.
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d. 957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Finally, the “motivating factor” standard allows the claimant to establish
a prima facie claim simply by showing that the impermissible
consideration influenced the adverse decision, even if other factors also
influenced the decision.138 A key distinction between the “but for”
standard and the “motivating factor” standard is that the “motivating
factor” standard allows the claimant, after establishing that an
impermissible consideration motivated the adverse decision, to shift the
burden to the employer to prove that the same decision would have been
made regardless.139 Then, even if the employer is successful in doing
so, the plaintiff is still entitled to limited remedies simply because the
employer negatively considered the impermissible factor (i.e. the
discriminatory factor).140
By way of example, consider an employer who terminates an
employee for being disabled, rude, and often late. Under the “solecause” test no liability could be established because the disability was
not the sole reason for the adverse decision—the rudeness and tardiness
also played a part. Under the “but for” test, liability could be
established only if the employee could prove that the rudeness and
tardiness alone were not enough for the employer to make the same
decision or, put another way, that had it not been for the disability, the
employee would not have been terminated. Under the “motivating
factor” standard, the employee could establish liability simply by
showing the disability played a role in the decision.
2. The Current State of the Law
Prior to the Gross decision, most circuits applied the “motivating
factor” standard in reviewing ADA claims.141 However, after the
Supreme Court decided Gross, the trend among circuits has been to
apply the “but for” test. Currently, the Sixth Circuit in Lewis and the
Seventh Circuit in Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. have
explicitly adopted the “but for” test for the ADA.142 At this point, the
only other federal appeals court that has explicitly adopted the “but for”
test as the ADA’s causation standard is the First Circuit.143 However,
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2009).
140. Id.
141. See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); Head v. Glacier Nw.,
Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337
(2d Cir. 2000); Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d
26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir. 1995).
142. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012); see also
Serwatka, 591 F.3d. at 962 (7th Cir. 2010).
143. Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2012).
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some circuits that have not yet had a chance to finally decide the issue
have indicated that the “motivating factor” test may no longer apply to
the ADA after Gross.144
The matter, however, is far from being settled. The Fifth Circuit in
Smith v. Xerox Corp. seems to have indicated an unwillingness to
blindly apply the reasoning in Gross to other anti-discrimination
statutes.145 The Smith court was faced with determining whether the
“motivating factor” standard from Title VII’s discrimination provision
should apply to Title VII’s retaliation provision which does not contain,
and was never amended to include, motivating factor language.146 The
Fifth Circuit held that a simplified application of Gross to Title VII
retaliation claims would be contrary to Gross’s admonition against
intermingling the interpretations of two statutory schemes, and
concluded that the motivating factor framework was controlling.147 This
decision may indicate an unwillingness of the Fifth Circuit to apply
Gross to the ADA.148 In addition, there are district courts still applying
the “motivating factor” standard to the ADA.149
The importance of analyzing this area of the law is only enhanced by
the current uncertainty. While the law seems to be trending in favor of a
“but for” standard, the answer is not definitive. Through careful
examination, we can understand why Lewis, and any case concurring in
its reasoning, was wrongly decided and hopefully help reverse the
current trend.
B. Lewis is Inconsistent with Sixth Circuit Precedent
The first issue with the majority’s decision in Lewis is the
inconsistency with circuit precedent. After the Gross decision, the Sixth
Circuit initially showed an ability to critically analyze other antidiscrimination statutes as opposed to blindly applying the reasoning of
the Gross Court. In Hunter v. Valley Local Sch., the plaintiff alleged
that she was placed on involuntary leave in violation of the Family
144. See Bolmer v. Oliveria, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding it “questionable” whether
ADA discrimination claims can proceed on mixed-motive theory after Gross); see also Pulczinski v.
Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1002 (8th Cir. 2012) (declining to decide the issue until it
is explicitly briefed by the parties).
145. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir. 2010).
146. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 328 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Smith, 602 F.3d at 328–29.
148. Allison P. Sues, Gross’ed Out: The Seventh Circuit’s Over Extension of Gross v. FBL
Financial Services into the ADA Context, 5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 356, 364 (2010).
149. Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also
George v. Roush & Yates Racing Engines, LLC., No. 5:11CV00025, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115495, at
*6–7 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2012). But see Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., 719 F. Supp. 2d 484,
503 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (applying a “but for” standard).
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Medical Leave Act (FMLA).150 The Sixth Circuit stated that it relies on
Title VII precedent to analyze FMLA claims, but noted that Gross
reminded the court that Title VII does not automatically control the
construction of other employment discrimination statutes.151
Ultimately, after careful analysis of the FMLA, the Sixth Circuit found
that the “motivating factor” standard, even after Gross, continued to
apply to the FMLA.152 Scholars on the subject cited this case as an
indication that the Sixth Circuit would not liberally apply Gross to other
anti-discrimination statutes and specifically would not follow the
Seventh Circuit’s application of Gross in the context of the ADA.153
The Lewis majority then abruptly decided that the “motivating factor”
standard would be available only under Title VII and not under any
other civil rights statutes (and therefore not available to the ADA).154 In
making this decision, the Sixth Circuit contradicted itself when, even
after Gross, it had already applied the “motivating factor” standard to a
civil rights statute, the FMLA.155
C. The Inconsistencies in Lewis
The Lewis decision was also internally inconsistent. The majority
began its opinion by purporting to be true to the mandate laid down in
Gross: that courts must refrain from applying rules applicable under one
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.156
With this caveat, the majority decided that a careful and critical
examination revealed that it should not continue to apply the “solecause” test, a test previously imported from the Rehabilitation Act, to
the ADA.157 However, the majority then reversed course and shunned
the careful and critical examination requirement when it failed to
critically examine the ADA and, instead, applied Gross in a blanket
fashion by assuming that the Supreme Court’s analysis of the ADEA
completely transferred to the ADA.158 Rather than carefully analyzing
the history, context, or purpose of the ADA, the majority hung its
decision on the fact that Title VII was amended by the CRA of 1991 to
150. Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 689 (6th Cir. 2009).
151. Id. at 691.
152. Id.
153. Sues, supra note 148, at 364.
154. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2012).
155. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–28 (2003) (finding that the
FMLA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the 14th Amendment equal protection clause
as it prevents gender based discrimination in the workplace).
156. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 316.
157. Id. at 317.
158. Id. at 329 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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include motivating factor language while the ADA, like the ADEA, was
not which it assumed was an indication that Congress did not intend the
“motivating factor” standard to apply to the ADA.159 It did not,
however, do a careful analysis of the context in which the ADA was
adopted and its relationship to Title VII, which would have shown that
the ADA did not need to be amended to accomplish this goal.160
Furthermore, the majority failed to do a careful analysis of the
numerous differences between the ADEA and the ADA before it applied
ADEA reasoning to the ADA. Instead the majority said, “[E]very
salient argument in favor of importing the ‘motivating factor’ burden
shifting test from Title VII into the ‘because of’ test of the ADA was
made in Gross.”161 Using the reasoning of Gross—an ADEA case—to
preordain the outcome of an ADA case expressly violates the
requirement that a careful and critical examination of the statute in
question is needed before mapping the causation standard of one statute
onto the causation standard of another statute.162 The majority also
discussed the impact of the legislative history on the ADA’s causation
standard, but ultimately found it unpersuasive because it, “did not alter
the outcome in Gross with respect to the ADEA, [and thus] it is difficult
to see why it would make a difference [in the ADA].”163 This is a
blatant example of the majority blindly applying the Court’s reasoning
in Gross and failing to examine the ADA on its own terms.
Additionally, the majority was inconsistent in its discussion of policy
implications. When discussing why the “sole-cause” test should be
discarded, the majority noted that Congress may find this standard
inconsistent with “a statute designed to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”164 After acknowledging this
purpose, the majority then applied a “but for” test. This test is also
inconsistent with a desire to eliminate disability discrimination as it
places a heavy burden on the plaintiff and allows discrimination to play
a role in employment decision so long as it is not the but-for cause.165
The policy implications of the majority’s decision are more fully
discussed in Part (D)(5).

159. Id.
160. Id. (explaining the importance of considering the timing of the Price Waterhouse case, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the ADA).
161. Id. at 321.
162. Id. at 316 (the majority citing the requirement that courts must refrain from applying rules
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination).
163. Id. at 321.
164. Id. at 316 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006)).
165. Id. at 323 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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D. The Lewis Decision Was Not Mandated by Gross
For the numerous reasons discussed below, the Lewis decision was
not mandated by Supreme Court precedent. Part 1 will discuss a
foundational error which infected the Lewis majority’s interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent; Part 2 will discuss the impact of the ADA’s
cross-references to Title VII; Part 3 will discuss the significance of the
timing of the ADA’s enactment; Part 4 will argue that the Lewis
decision is contrary to clear legislative intent; and Part 5 will make a
policy-based argument.
1. The Foundational Error of Lewis
The majority built its decision on an unsound foundation when it
argued that Price Waterhouse and the subsequent legal history,
including the CRA of 1991, could only be interpreted two ways: 1) the
CRA of 1991 codified Price Waterhouse and “because of” always
means a “motivating factor” standard applies, or 2) a “motivating
factor” standard applies to Title VII only and to no other civil rights
statutes.166 With this false dichotomy in place, the majority, drawing
from Gross, found that the second theory was correct and that Congress
intended to provide a “motivating factor” standard to Title VII
claimants, but not to claimants under other civil rights statutes.167 With
this framework infecting the majority’s entire analysis, the erroneous
outcome that a “motivating factor” standard does not apply to the ADA
(a civil rights statute) is a foregone conclusion.168 So why is this
dichotomy wrong? The first view is too simplistic. Congress did not
simply codify Price Waterhouse through the CRA of 1991; rather, it
departed from Price Waterhouse in a key way by allowing liability to be
established based simply on proof that an impermissible consideration
was a motivating factor even when the employer was able to prove the
same decision would have been made absent the impermissible
consideration.169 But the second view, the idea that the CRA of 1991
was meant to completely nullify the applicability of the Price
Waterhouse burden shifting, is also wrong.170 Again, instead of doing a
careful analysis of the ADA as required by the Supreme Court, the
majority in Lewis supported it position by arguing that it was mandated

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 318.
Id. at 327 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 334 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
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by Gross, a case involving a totally different statute.171 The conclusion
that a “motivating factor” framework no longer applies to other civil
rights statutes is especially odd when the Sixth Circuit itself, post Gross,
has held that a “motivating factor” standard applies in the context of the
FMLA, itself a civil rights statute.172 The fact that the CRA of 1991 was
not meant to nullify the applicability of a “motivating factor” standard to
other anti-discrimination states, and the ADA in particular, is rooted in
the text of the ADA, the context in which the ADA was adopted, and the
statute’s legislative history.
2. The ADA’s Cross-reference to Title VII
A major tenet of the majority’s position was that, through the CRA of
1991, Congress amended Title VII to include motivating factor language
but at the same time neglected to add this language to the ADA.173
According to the majority, this omission was intentional and should be
considered a signal that the “motivating factor” standard does not apply
to the ADA.174 This reasoning is largely drawn from analogous
reasoning by the Gross Court which made a similar argument regarding
the ADEA.175 However, the majority failed to recognize a major
problem with simply copying the reasoning of the Gross Court: the
ADA, unlike the ADEA, is directly linked to Title VII via crossreferences.176 Here, the ADA’s incorporation of Title VII’s causation
standard through express cross-references makes explicit amendment to
the ADA unnecessary.177 Through the ADA’s cross-references, Title
VII’s remedies apply to the ADA with equal force and validity.178 The
ADA does not include its own enforcement provisions but rather
incorporates those of Title VII through the following language in section
12117(a):
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4,
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of [Title VII] shall be the
powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the
[EEOC], to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging
179
discrimination on the basis of disability.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 318.
Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 2009).
Lewis, 681 F.3d at 318.
Id.
Id. (citing Gross v. FBL Financial Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)).
Id. at 324 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 322.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006).
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Of the provisions referenced above, only 2000e-5 is truly an
enforcement provision.180 The relevant part of this provision, 2000e5(g)(2)(B), holds:
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section
2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the
respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the court—
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in
clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of
this title;181

And finally, 2000e-2(m) holds that:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.182

After considering the relevant provisions above, the majority made
two arguments. First, the majority argued that the “motivating factor”
standard from Title VII does not apply to the ADA because it is actually
embodied in 2000e-2(m), a provision that the ADA does not explicitly
cross-reference.183 The majority next argued that the motivating factor
framework laid out in 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), a provision that is crossreferenced in the ADA, does not actually apply to ADA claimants
because it starts by stating, “On a claim in which an individual proves
a violation under section 2000e-2(m).”184 Thus, the majority argued,
this does not apply to ADA claimants because 2000e-2(m) is a
provision that applies to Title VII claimants and discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, not a disability.185
The majority’s argument that the “motivating factor” standard does
not apply to the ADA because section 2000e-2(m) of Title VII is not
directly cross-referenced in the ADA is dishonest. Clearly 2000e-2(m)
would not be directly referenced in the ADA’s enforcement provision as
it, in fact, is not an enforcement provision at all (it simply defines illegal
180. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 339 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that
2000e-4 discusses the powers of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2000e-6 discusses the
procedures for civil actions brought by the Attorney General, 2000e-8 discusses investigations, and
2000e-9 discusses hearings and investigations).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (2009).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
183. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 320.
184. Id. at 320–21.
185. Id. at 320.
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conduct) and reference to it as an enforcement provision would be
nonsensical.186 And while 2000e-2(m) is not referenced specifically in
the ADA, it is referenced (twice) in the 2000e-5, a section that is
directly cross-referenced in the ADA.187
Next, the majority’s argument that 2000e-5’s motivating factor
language is inapplicable to ADA claimants because it first requires a
violation of 2000e-2(m), which refers only to race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin, is facially absurd. 2000e-2(m) refers only to these
forms of discrimination because these are the forms of discrimination
addressed in the statute in which it is found. If 2000e-2(m) had been
expressly incorporated in the ADA, would it still be available to an
ADA claimant only if the claimant could also prove racial or gender
discrimination in addition to disability based discrimination? Of course
not. Additionally, if the majority was really willing to follow this
extremely literal logic, then it should have been prepared to find the
entire ADA unenforceable. Section 12117 of the ADA says, “The
powers . . . set forth in . . . 2000e-5 [of Title VII] . . . shall be the
powers . . . of the Commission.”188
Then 2000e-5 says, “The
Commission is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in
any unlawful employment practice as set forth in [2000e-2 or 2000e-3]
of this title.”189 By the majority’s logic, because 2000e-2 and 2000e-3
are not expressly incorporated into the ADA and refer only to
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin,
then the Commission has no power at all in relation to the ADA. Of
course, the majority would likely not extend their logic to reach this
absurd result, but it shows the error in the majority’s overly literal
reasoning.
Failure to allow liability under the “motivating factor” standard in
section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of Title VII would be to cross-reference
remedies for a claim which could not be established.190 It is more than
reasonable to assume that by referencing these provisions in the ADA,
Congress intended to make these remedies available to ADA
claimants.191 Ultimately, Congress’s failure to specifically amend the
ADA to include motivating factor language is of no consequence. The
ADA itself did not need to be amended as the ADA’s cross-references to
Title VII ensured that any amendments to Title VII’s causation standard,
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2009).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2009).
190. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 320 (holding that no ADA plaintiffs will prevail under 2000e-2(m) and
thus remedies under 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) cannot be achieved).
191. Id. at 340 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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including the amendments in the CRA of 1991, would also apply to the
ADA.192
3. The Timing of the ADA, Price Waterhouse and the CRA of 1991
The timing of the ADA’s enactment is crucial to the understanding of
its meaning. When the Price Waterhouse decision was handed down in
1989, the Supreme Court decided that “because of” in the context of
Title VII included a burden shifting framework in which, if the
employee showed that an impermissible consideration was a motivating
factor in an adverse decision, the employer was required to show the
same decision would have been made absent this impermissible
consideration.193 The ADA was then adopted just one year later at a
time when Congress was fully aware of the contemporary interpretation
of “because of.”194 The logical conclusion is that when Congress used
the term “because of” in the ADA, it expected it to be interpreted in
conformity with the term’s understanding at that time.195 As “because
of” at the time of the ADA’s enactment was understood to incorporate a
motivating factor/ burden shifting framework, the same standard would
apply to the ADA.196 And, as discussed above, the ADA’s crossreference to Title VII ensured that the amendments made to the Price
Waterhouse definition of “because of” would also apply to the ADA.197
The context of the ADA’s enactment stands in sharp contrast to that
of the ADEA. The ADEA was adopted in 1967, well before Price
Waterhouse’s definition of “because of.” This is a major difference
between the ADEA and the ADA and is yet another reason that the
majority’s reliance on Gross, without a careful examination of the ADA
on its own, is misguided.198 While it may have been reasonable for the
Gross Court to believe that failure to amend the ADEA, which does not
cross-reference Title VII and was not adopted when “because of” was
understood to include a “motivating factor” standard, meant that
Congress did not intend for a “motivating factor” standard to apply to
the ADEA, the same cannot be said for the ADA. At the time the CRA
192. Id.
193. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
194. Lewis, 681 F. 3d at 326 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (“[I]t is not only appropriate but also
realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [our] precedents . . . and that it expect[s]
its enactment[s] to be interpreted in conformity with them.”).
196. Lewis, 681 F. 3d at 326 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. Id. at 322 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198. Id. at 329 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ignoring that context and
declaring blanket applicability of Gross, the majority assumes that the Supreme Court’s ADEA statutory
analysis simply transfers to the ADA).
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of 1991 was adopted, “because of” in the ADA was seen as consistent
with Price Waterhouse and contained an express cross-reference to Title
VII.199 The fact that the ADA was not amended does not indicate that
Congress intended ADA claims to be treated differently from Title VII
claims; rather it meant just the opposite—that Congress was indicating
its willingness to continue the existing system of treating ADA claims
consistently with Title VII claims. Had this not been the case, Congress
would have amended the ADA to make this change clear.
4. The Legislative History of the ADA
A tenet of statutory construction is that courts are obliged to interpret
a law consistent with clear legislative intent.200 The Lewis majority
shirked this obligation by ignoring a mass of legislative history
indicating that Congress intended the ADA to be interpreted consistent
with Title VII and thus be governed by a “motivating factor”
standard.201 A 1990 House Report on the ADA noted, “Because of the
cross-reference to Title VII [in the ADA], any amendments to Title
VII . . . would be fully applicable to the ADA.”202 This is direct
evidence that the amendments made to Title VII via the CRA of 1991,
which provided for a “motivating factor” standard, were intended to
apply to the ADA. The majority countered this piece of legislative
history simply by saying that it disagreed with the idea that the ADA is
cross-referenced to Title VII in a way that requires the Title VII
causation standard to be applied to the ADA.203 What the majority
failed to realize was that it was not its prerogative to interpret a statute in
a way that is clearly at odds with legislative intent. This same report
further emphasized the congressional intent to make the remedies and
protections available to Title VII claimants also available to ADA
claimants when it said:
An amendment was offered . . . that would have removed the crossreference to Title VII and would have substituted the actual words of
the cross-referenced sections. This amendment was an attempt to freeze
the current Title VII remedies in the ADA. This amendment was rejected
as antithetical to the purpose of the ADA—to provide civil rights
protections for persons with disabilities that are parallel to those available
to minorities and women. By retaining the cross-reference to Title VII,
the Committee’s intent is that the remedies of Title VII, currently and as
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id. at 331.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 471.
Lewis, 681 F.3d at 320.
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amended in the future, will be applicable to persons with disabilities.204

If further evidence of congressional intent was needed, the 1990 House
Report also states, “[I]f the powers, remedies and procedures change in
Title VII, they will change identically under the ADA for persons with
disabilities.”205 Clearly, Congress intended for the ADA to have
remedies that were identical to those enumerated in Title VII. The
Lewis majority limited the remedies available to an ADA claimant, as
compared to a Title VII claimant, by eschewing the “motivating factor”
standard and requiring but-for causation.206
It is also worth noting that while the majority’s heavy focus on the
words “because of” is understandable, Congress likely did not intend for
these words to carry an extreme amount of weight.207 It must be
remembered that the ADA was adopted in the wake of Price
Waterhouse, a plurality decision that clearly established a motivatingfactor/burden-shifting framework but failed to come to an exact
consensus on what “because of” meant.208 The fact that Congress
nevertheless retained this language is an indication that it is not the
definition of the term but the associated procedures that matter.209
Furthermore, had Congress intended the words “because of” to carry
such great weight and establish but-for causation, why would they have
amended the ADA in 2008 to replace the term “because of” with “on the
basis of”?210 The purpose of the amendment was not to help clarify
“because of” (this was pre-Gross when there was a consensus among the
circuits on the meaning); rather, the amendment was made for a totally
unrelated purpose and replacing “because of” with “on the basis of”
seems to have been simply an innocuous word choice.211 Had “because
of” been intended to carry so much weight and to be used as the
determinative causation standard, it is unlikely that Congress would
have haphazardly discarded the phrase in the 2008 amendment.
5. Policy Considerations
Beyond the legal arguments for adopting a “motivating factor”
204. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (III) at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 471
(emphasis added).
205. Id.
206. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 331 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207. Id. at 315 (stating that no matter the common history and shared goals of the two laws, they do
not share the same text. Different words usually convey different meanings).
208. Id. at 333 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id.
210. ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5, 122 Stat. 3553, 3557 (2008).
211. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § (2)(a)–(b) (listing the findings and purposes associated
with amending the ADA, none of which relating to the clarification of the causation standard).
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standard, there are also strong policy reasons to adopt this standard.
When taking into the account the stated purpose of the ADA, the
elimination of disability based discrimination, it becomes clear that a
“motivating factor” standard is much more compatible with the goals of
the ADA than a “but for” test.212 A “but for” test does not advocate for
a complete elimination of disability discrimination; rather, it
affirmatively allows some amount of discrimination so long as the
employer has other legitimate reasons for making the adverse
employment decision. Instead of conveying that discrimination in any
amount is unacceptable, a “but for” test sends the message to employers
that a little disability based discrimination is acceptable, so long as they
have additional “good” reasons to fire the disabled employee.213
Allowing any discrimination is at odds with the ADA’s stated purpose:
“to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination” and “to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities” by reinstating a broad scope of protection.214 Clearly, a
“but for” standard is out of touch with the goals of the ADA and the
intent of Congress.
Beyond the undesirable message conveyed by a “but for” test, this
standard is also practically burdensome for ADA claimants. The “but
for” standard requires that the plaintiff prove that without his/her
disability, other negative but non-discriminatory factors would not have
been enough for the employer to make the same adverse decision.215
This requires that the employee discover objective evidence of the
employer’s state of mind and be able to show the employer’s internal
motivations.216 In other words, the employee is burdened with the
unreasonable task of identifying the precise causal role play by the
legitimate and illegitimate motivations. In practice, an employee will
rarely be able to discover such objective evidence or prove what role
different motivations played in the employer’s decision, leaving the
employer free to offer a parade of pretextual justifications for the
decision.217 The “motivating factor” standard set out in Title VII more
appropriately shifts the burden to the employer, who has better access to
the information used in making the decision, to show that the same

212. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 324.
213. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 47 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585 (amending
Price Waterhouse because [the but-for aspects of its holding] sent a message that a little overt, sexism or
racism is okay, as long as it was not the only basis for the employer’s action).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(2) (2009).
215. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 323.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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decision would have been made absent the impermissible
consideration.218 And even if this is shown, it conveys that any
disability based discrimination, no matter how small, is impressible by
imposing limited liability any time discriminatory motivations play a
role in an adverse employment decision.219
V. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons outlined above, the Lewis majority applied the
incorrect causation standard to the ADA. The unfortunate reality is that
other circuits have already followed this decision, which itself followed
the Seventh Circuit.220 Continuing this current trend can only work to
the detriment of ADA claimants and disabled persons in general.
Fortunately, the ADA’s causation standard is far from being finally
decided, and there is still hope that the situation can be remedied. With
the circuits trending toward a “but for” causation standard, the Supreme
Court may not grant certiorari on the issue, and thus, going forward,
reliance on the Supreme Court to correct this error may not be
advisable.221 There is currently legislation pending in Congress which
responds to Gross by amending both the ADEA and the ADA to include
a “motivating factor” standard.222 Unfortunately, this legislation has
previously stalled in Congress and it is not considered likely to be
enacted.223 One possible solution to this issue may be found in the 2008
amendments to the ADA. Although most courts have considered the
change inconsequential for purposes of the causation standard, the fact
that “because of” in the ADA has been amended to read “on the basis
of” could be a way for future courts to distinguish Lewis which
interpreted the pre-amendment version of the ADA.
Ultimately, the Lewis decision is at odds with prior precedent, is
internally inconsistent, is not mandated by the Supreme Court, is
contrary to congressional intent, and runs counter to persuasive policy
considerations. Accordingly, in order to mitigate the damage caused by
this decision, it should be invalidated by congressional legislation and
its reasoning should not be followed by other courts in the future.

218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2009).
219. Id.
220. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d. 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2012).
221. 23-510 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 510.21 (3d ed.
2010) (describing how the existence of a conflict among circuits has historically been one of the most
frequent reasons to grant certiorari).
222. See Protecting Older Works Against Discrimination Act, S. 2189, 112th Cong. (2012).
223. See S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009).
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